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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

What is the required foundation for the admission

of expert testimony relating to the breathalyzer test?
2.

Is the Utah Implied Consent Law (Utah Code Ann.

1953, §41-6-44.10(a)), constitutional?
3.

Were field sobriety tests affirmative acts governed

by Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980)?
4.

What constitutes custodial interrogation requiring

the Miranda warning?
5.

May the results of the breathalyzer test at the

time of the test be admitted without proper instruction to determine the amount of alcohol in the blood at the time of the driving?
6.

Was the appellant denied due process of law by the

lower courts permitting a mandatory rebuttable presumption relative
to the percentage of alcohol in the blood and being under the
influence of intoxicating liquor?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a drunk driving case.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The appellant was tried before a jury in the circuit
court and was convicted for being in violation of a city ordinance
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS
The appellant was sentenced in the circuit court and

appealed to the district court.
The district court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court and remanded the case for execution of the judgment, with a
stay to perfect this appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW
At approximately 10:00 o'clock p.m., January 8, 1982, the
appellant and the arresting officer were both traveling in a westerly
direction on 900 South between and State and Main Street (T.37 and
T.38).

The arresting officer was one-fourth block behind the

appellant (T.41 and T.91) and saw the appellant going west on 900
South (T.99) and into the storage lane for making a left-hand turn
onto Main Street (T.100).

There were no other vehicles in the area

(T.40), and the two lanes of traffic to the right of the appellant
were clear of traffic (T.100).
Prior to that instant, the arresting officer had seen no
irregular driving pattern by the appellant -- no zigzagging, no
changing of lanes, no weaving -- not one iota of impaired driving
ability while the appellant was driving for many blocks west on
900 South (T.115).
After the appellant had properly entered the storage lane
for a left-hand turn to go south on Main Street, while she was
approximately 35 feet from the crosswalk, she abruptly turned into
the right-hand lane on 900 South and then turned right onto Main
Street and proceeded properly in a northerly direction (T.39).
The arresting officer testified that he had seen others,
-2-

who were not under the influence of alcohol, make similar turns
(T.100 and T.101) while in control of their vehicles (T.114).

In

fact, the arresting officer also made an improper right-hand turn
from the center lane on 900 South onto Main Street (T.40).
The appellant did not drive erratically after making the
right-hand turn before the arresting officer turned on his overhead
red and blue lights because of the improper right-hand turn (T.40
and T.101).

When he turned on his siren, she stopped abruptly in

the lane she was in (T.ll and T.112) and then drove to the far side
of the road at 865 South Main Street (T.35, T.38, and T.lll).
The appellant had control over her vehicle.
swerve.

She did not

She did not cause anyone else any problems in the other

lanes of traffic.

She did not hit any parked cars (T.lll).

The only driving pattern which caused the arresting officer
to stop the appellant was the improper right-hand turn from the
storage lane on 900 South onto Main Street and then the abrupt stop
immediately after the siren was turned on because of the improper
right-hand turn (T.115), both of which could have been made by one
not under the influence of alcohol (T.100, T.101, T.114, and T.115).
The appellant was initially stopped and arrested for and
charged with the offense of making an improper right-hand turn from
the storage lane on 900 South onto Main Street in violation of
Section 195 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
This charge was dismissed at trial (T.10).
-3-

When the

arresting officer approached the appellant's parked vehicle, the
appellant rolled down her window, and the arresting officer detected
an odor of alcohol.

This was one reason the arresting officer

believed the appellant to be under the influence of alcohol (T.42
and T.100).

Yet, the arresting officer admitted that persons with

the odor of and/or the consumption of alcohol can still be in
control of the vehicle without being under the influence of alcohol
(T.114).
The instant the arresting officer detected the odor of
alcohol, without knowing how much of or what kind of alcohol which
caused the odor (T.102), he took her into custody (T.122), arrested
her (T.123), and questioned her about drinking (T.43) and performing field sobriety tests without giving her the Miranda warning or
constitutional rights relating to self-incrimination (T.122 and
T.123) .
The appellant requested a lawyer, but the arresting officer
refused her request until she had performed a test (T.122).
The arresting officer asked the appellant if she had been
drinking.

The appellant said she had had something to drink (T.43).
Field sobriety tests were performed.

The arresting

officer then told the appellant she was being arrested for Driving
While Under the Influence of Alcohol (T.51).
The appellant was handcuffed and taken to the Salt Lake
County Jail.

She again asked for a lawyer, as she had asked for a

lawyer at the location of arrest at 865 South Main Street, Salt Lake
-4-

City, Utah (T.65).

Her request was denied.

She was told of the

Implied Consent Law and was given a breathalyzer test by officer
Dana Orgill who had been trained and certified only to administer
such a test (T.64) by following written instructions.

These were

his only qualifications from training and certification (T.74).
Officer Orgill knew nothing about the authenticity or accuracy of
the breathalyzer machine (T.78), which was a Series 900 Breathalyzer,
using a chemical ampoule, Control Number 803 (T.67), which was
destroyed and not in evidence (T.76), but could have been kept to
check the authenticity of the chemical in that particular ampoule
(T.78).

Officer Orgill had no education of chemistry, physiology,

or blood (T.72 and T.73).

His only qualification was to follow

directions the same as a person would do by assembling a toy (T.74).
Officer Orgill administered one test only (T.91).

He

testified it was a poor test (T.89) and that a poor test was not
an accurate test (T.92).

He also testified that he had no knowledge

of the amount of alcohol in the blood of the appellant at the time
of driving, only what the machine indicated at the time of testing
(T.79, T.80, and T.81).
The record is entirely void of any evidence at all of the
amount of alcohol in the blood of the appellant at the time of
driving.
The respondent called two witnesses.

One was Officer

Orgill who transported the appellant from the scene to the Salt Lake
County Jail and administered the breathalyzer test.
-5-

The other was

the arresting officer, James W. Pryor.
The trial court then asked the respondent if it had any
other witnesses.

The respondent said, "No, your Honor." (T.134).

The trial court then stated to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, the parties, the
City and the defendant have stipulated
that if a highway patrol trooper by the
name of Mark Nielsen were called to
testify, he would testify as follows:
That he, by assignment, is the maintenance man, if we can use that phrase,
maintenance man for the breathalyzer
which is kept in the Salt Lake City
Jail. And that within 20 days prior
to the date of this incident, he
examined that machine and found it
to be working properly, and within 20
days after the date of this incident,
he examined the machine and found it
to be working properly.
Now, he has not been called,
because the parties have stipulated
that he would testify to that if he
were here.
City rests? (T. 134, T.135).
Immediately after the trial court asked, "City rests,"
the respondent moved to admit Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, all of which
related to the breathalyzer test.

The appellant objected to their

admissability because of lack of foundation (T.135).
The appellant at the time of the above objection also
moved to strike the testimony and moved for a mistrial because the
appellant was interrogated and in custody without the Miranda
warning when she was asked and admitted that she had had something
to drink (T.135).
The appellant also moved to dismiss because the respondent
-6-

did not give her the Implied Consent Law or the Miranda warning
verbatim, as he should have, but only by a verbal summary (T.136).
And the arresting officer commanded her to perform the field sobriety tests without advising her of her constitutional rights relative
to self-incrimination, all of which was before trial argued in a
motion to suppress evidence (T.137).
The appellant also objected to the admissability of the
evidence relating to the breathalyzer test because of lack of
foundation in that there was no expert witness as to how the
breathalyzer machine operates (T.137).
All we have here is that a maintenance man,
had he been here to testify, would say
well, I checked it 20 days before and I
checked it 20 days after, it was okay,
as far as I know. Now, there is absolutely
no foundation as to this person's qualifications
as being an expert to check that machine.
Our stipulation goes merely to a maintenance man checking it. That!s not foundation to show that it's authentic. Joe Blow
from Idaho could come down and say I checked
it, I checked it; that doesn't mean that
there's any explanation before this jury as to
how that machine works, nothing as to the
chemical analysis or anything else.
You have a blood test, you have to
have a doctor or whoever withdrew the blood,
you have to have the chemist explain what
kind of a test he did. You don't just say
I'm a chemist and I made the test. There's
no test here at all to show that that: was
authentic, none whatsoever, and therefore,
there's no foundation and I object to the
admissibility of the breath test results
for that reason and the field tests for the
other reasons that I've given, and the statement against interest for the reasons that
I've given.
And I incorporate my objections into
-7-

a motion to dismiss, for insufficient
evidence (T.137 and T.138).
In overruling the appellant!s objection relating to the
admissibility of evidence relating to the breathalyzer test, the
court stated that the stipulation included that the machine was in
good working order (T.139).
That was not the stipulation!
quoted above.

The stipulation has been

The stipulation was limited to the proffered testi-

mony of a maintenance man.
Even the trial court stated:
Now, you may argue, certainly, the
qualifications that are not before the
jury as to what Mark Nielsen knows or
doesn't know, but nevertheless, the
stipulation is it was in good working
order (T.139).
This statement of the trial court is an erroneous statement of the stipulation.

The stipulation, as quoted verbatim above,

was limited to the proffered testimony of a maintenance man. The
stipulation most certainly did not include that the breathalyzer
was in good working order.

Nor did it include that the maintenance

man was a qualified expert technician who followed the requirements
of the procedures established by the Commission of Public Safety
pursuant to A18-02-1: Breath Testing Regulations.
The respondent rested, and the appellant stated:
If thatfs all the City has, we'll
rest, too, your Honor. (T.141)
The trial court then instructed the jury. (T.141-T.148).
The trial court instructed the jury that there is a
-8-

presumption of innocence (T.142) and that there is a presumption
of guilt (T.146).
The trial court instructed the jury that the respondent
has the burden of proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt (T.142).

And the trial court instructed the jury that the

presumption of guilt (T.146) may be rebutted by the appellant (T.
146).

Yet, the trial court further instructed the jury there is

no requirement of testimony by the appellant (T.144).
The trial court instructed the jury relating to the
presumption of guilt:
(c) If there was at the time of driving
0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol
in the defendant's blood, it shall be
presumed that the defendant was under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor.
(T.146).
The trial court also instructed the jury that the accuracy
of the breathalyzer test was a question of fact for the jury alone
to determine (T.146).
The trial court also instructed the jury that they were
the exclusive judges of the facts (T.147).
Summations were made by both parties, and the appellant
was found guilty and sentenced.
The judgment of the circuit court was appealed to the
district court.
The district court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court and remanded with a stay of execution to perfect this appeal
to this court.
-9-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant argues that before the result of the
breathalyzer test can be admitted into evidence, there must be a
foundation laid to establish its accuracy and trustworthiness by
qualified expert testimony.

That expert must meet the statutory

and regulatory standards and not be but a "maintenance" man who
checked the machine before and after the test.
The appellant argues that the Implied Consent Law is a
denial of due process and equal protection by permitting the arresting officer the choice of chemical tests in that he alone may give
another in the same classification as the appellant the advantage
of a blood test over a breath test.
The appellant argues that the results of the field sobriety tests should not have been admitted into evidence in violation
of self-incrimination because they were affirmative acts and
"evidence" before American Fork v. Cosgrove, which cannot be applied
retroactively.
The appellant argues that custodial testimony should not
have been admitted because she was in custody while being interrogated
and denied the constitutional protections of the Miranda warning.
The appellant argues that there was no evidence as to the
amount of alcohol in the blood at the time of driving.
The appellant finally argues most strenuously against the
mandatory rebuttable presumption instruction which shifted the
burden of proof to the appellant re reasonable doubt.
-10-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF THE RESULTS
OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST FOR LACK OF
FOUNDATION FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Certain findings are necessary to establish a proper
foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence.

(Murray

City v. Hall, Utah , 663 P . 2d 1314 (1983) ) .
To establish a presumption of the validity of the test
results, there must be an affirmative finding by the trial court
that the calibration and testing for the accuracy of the breathalyzer
and the trustworthiness of the ampoules were performed in accordance
with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(Murray City, supra).
Those standards are set forth in A18-02-1: Breath Testing
Regulations.

3 (b) requires callibrations tests to be performed by

a "technician."

The record is void of any evidence by a technician.

The only evidence relating to a breathalyzer was the stipulation
that a "maintenance man" found the machine to be working properly.
The trial court made no such affirmative finding.

And the breath-

alyzer he examined was kept in the Salt Lake City Jail (T.134 and
T.135).

The appellant's breath test was administered in the Salt

Lake County Jail (T.51).
5 (c)(2) requires the breath test technician to have
successfully completed the Breath Testing Supervisors course offered
-11-

by Indiana State University or a manufacturers repair technician
course for the breath testing instruments in use in the State of
Utah.

The record if void of any such evidence or affirmative

finding by the trial court.

In fact, the trial court stated:

Now, you may argue, certainly, the
qualifications that are not before
the jury as to what Mark Nielsen
knows or doesn't know.... (T.139).
Mark Nielsen was the maintenance man whose proffered
testimony was in the stipulation (T.134 and T.135).

And that stip-

ulation included only that his proffered testimony would be that
he checked the machine before and after (T.IO), that within 20 days
prior to the date of this incident, he examined that machine and
found it to be working properly, and within 20 days after the date
of this incident, he examined the machine and found it to be working
properly (T.135).
The stipulation contained nothing more than the stipulation read to the jury (T.134 and T.135).
It was made clear to the trial court and to the respondent
that the appellant was challenging the authenticity and validity of
the test itself:
THE COURT:
Now, one further thing to make sure
we are all on the same track, as I
recall, this matter was continued
from its previous setting, it was
indicated that there would be a
stipulation as to the testimony of
Trooper Mark Nielsen if he were
called and would testify that he
-12-

checked the machine before and
after; is that correct?
MR. HANSEN:
Yes. Mr. George and I had a
discussion on the telephone
Friday. At that time, I thought
existed a difference of opinion,
but I told him I wouldn't be
picking flyspecks out of pepper
and that he wouldn't have to call
certain officers. I want it
clear, though, that if you'll
recall when he talked about a
continuance in chambers, that I
was challenging the authenticity
of the test itself, not the checking of the machines and mechanical
manipulation of using, but when
we discussed that phase of it in
chambers, I said I couldn't stipulate to the authenticity of the
results of the test, because I
was arguing the blood problem.
THE COURT:
Right.
MR. HANSEN:
So, for clarification, I said that
they wouldn't have to have somebody
come down, they could handle it by
a proffer in saying that he checked
it a certain day before and whatever.
THE COURT:
That's correct.
MR. HANSEN:

A c e r t a i n day a f t e r , and that the
other officer can say that he pushed
the buttons or whatever. That's
not as to the v a l i d i t y .
-13-

THE COURT:
Right. And that will be contained
in the instruction that 1 give,
that will be a jury question as to
the validity of the test.
(T.10 and T.ll).
MR. HANSEN:
Thank you.
At the close of the respondent's case in chief, the
respondent moved to admit its Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 pertaining to
the breathalyzer.

The appellant objected for lack of foundation

(T.135), among other reasons, because there was absolutely no
foundation as to the maintenance man's qualifications as being an
expert to check the machine and because there was no expert, no
foundation whatsoever, as to how that machine operates (T.137).
The stipulation went merely to a maintenance man checking
it.

That is not sufficient foundation to show that it was authentic

(T.137).

There was no test at all to show authenticity, none

whatsoever.
Notwithstanding the appellant's objection for lack of
foundation, the court admitted all respondent's exhibits, all relating
to the breathalyzer.
Furthermore, the trial court did not make an affirmative
finding that the calibration and testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules were performed in accordance with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety.
All of this amounted to prejudicial error, and the judgment
of the trial court and the order of the district court should be reversed
-14-

(Murray City v. Hall, supra; State v. Lee, Utah,

P.2d

(1983);

State v, Jones, 316 S.2d 103 (1975); Westermann v. State, Okla.,
525 P.2d 1359 (1974); and Keel v. Alaska, Al., 609 P.2d 553 (1980)).
POINT II
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OF THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST BASED ON A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
§41-6-44.10(a), is unconstitutional, in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, § § 7 and 27 of the Utah
Constitution because it states that the arresting officer shall
determine which of three chemical tests -- breath, blood, or urine -shall be administered for the purpose of determining whether an
arrested person was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
or a combination thereof while driving or being in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle.
November 1, 1982, before trial, the appellant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence of the breathalyzer test.

December

6, 1982, the day of the trial, but prior to the jury being sworn,
that motion was argued (T.9) and denied by the trial court (T.9).
Chiseled in marble above the United States Supreme Court
-- "Equal Justice Under Law,! -- glaringly tells the world that what
is fair for one is fair for all in any given situation.
This is also the cornerstone of Article I, § § 7 and 27
-15-

of the Constitution of Utah:
Sec. 7: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process
of law.
Sec. 27: Frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of
individual rights....
The word "equal" means the same, even, alike, identical,
neither inferior nor superior, just uniform, matched, level, par,
commensurate, balanced, no more no less, share and share alike,
6 of one and 1/2 dozen of the other, all for one and one for all,
half and half, as good as, fairness, distinction without a difference. ... (Words and Phrases; Webster's New International Dictionary,
Unabridged Edition; Rogetfs Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases;
and cases galore from all jurisdictions.)
The purpose of due process and equal protection laws is
to give to all persons similarly situated the guaranteed rights
to fair and equal treatment.

For example, a law will violate due

process and equal protection when it accords different treatments
to different persons within various classifications, i.e., different
chemical tests to determine amount of alcohol in the blood of all
suspected drunk drivers.
Furthermore, a law will violate due process and equal
protection when it places burdens or privileges on different persons
within the same classification exercising their fundamental rights.
This is precisely what Utah's Implied Consent Law does.
-16-

It places unwarranted burdens or privileges on different persons
within the same classification exercising their fundamental rights.
One of the most fundamental rights is the right to a fair trial.
And the right to a fair trial incorporates the right: to be advised
of and to confront the evidence to be used against a person at
trial to entitle that person to an intelligent defense in light of
all relevant and accessible evidence. (Pitchess v. Superior Court,
Cal., 522 P.2d 305 (1974)).
In the instant case the appellant was not advised of her
rights to confront the evidence to be used against her at trial to
entitle her to an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and
accessible evidence.
Yet, others in the same classification have been and are
so advised.

This is a definite denial of due process and equal

protection of the law.
James W. Pryor, the arresting officer, admitted that he did
not give the appellant the Miranda warning (T.122, T.123, and T.126).
Yet, he has given the Miranda warning on other occasions (T.123).
That is not equal.

The arresting officer also admitted that he did

not read Utahfs Implied Consent Law to the appellant (T.124).

He

merely explained (T.52, T.52, and T.124), told (T.124), and advised
(T.123, T.124, and T.125) the appellant of the consequences if she
refused to submit to the breath test.

Even then, he erroneously

advised her, because he said her driver's license would be suspended
rather than revoked.

He admitted that the only thing he gave her
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relative to Utah's Implied Consent Law was his summary of it. He
did not give it to her as stated exactly in the law (T.126).
Utah's Implied Consent Law is required to be read verbatim
to the appellant and all others in the same classification.
(Gassman v. Dorius, Utah, 543 P.2d 197 (1975); Elliott v. Dorius,
Utah, 557 P.2d 759 (1976)).
This was not done to the appellant; yet, it has been and
still is being done to others in the same classification.

This is

not equal.
Neither did the officers advise at all, in any manner
whatsoever, that the appellant had the right to have a blood or
urine test in addition to the breath test, as is afforded others
in the same classifications as provided in Utah's Implied Consent
Law (T.119).

This is not equal.

The appellant objected to all of this, the admission of
all exhibits, moved to suppress, moved to strike, moved to dismiss,
and moved for mistrial, all of which were overruled or denied
(T.9, T.135, T.136, T.137, and T.138).
Utah's Implied Consent Law provides that a peace officer
shall determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered....
The effect of this is to deprive the appellant and others in the
same classifications due process and equal protection of the law,
because it places unwarranted burdens or privileges on different
persons in the same classifications exercising their fundamental
rights.
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By authorizing police officers to determine in their sole
discretion which chemical test to administer, the Utah Legislature
has in effect allowed the police officers to determine who will have
an adequate defense.
For example, persons in the same classification who have
blood or urine tests administered have unwarranted privileges in
the exercise of their fundamental rights.

Those who have breath

tests administered have unwarranted burdens in the exercise of their
fundamental rights.
Upon completion of a blood or urine test, those samples
can be preserved and analyzed again.

Upon completion of a breath

test, however, that sample disappears (T.76).
destruction of evidence."

It amounts to T,the

(Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,

367; 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780; 84 S.Ct. 881.)
can it be independently analyzed.

It is not preserved, nor

The only record of a breath test

is a formal writing or a printout card indicating the frequently
questionable results.

In fact, the breathalyzer test has been

replaced by the intoxilyzer test because of the inaccuracy of the
breathalyzer test.

Extraction of blood samples for testing is a

highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person
is under the influence of alcohol. (Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
at 436, n. 3; 1 L.Ed.2d at 451).
Upon completion of a breath test, an independent forensic
chemist cannot examine the breath test sample to determine its
accuracy.

The kinds, quality, nor quantities of chemicals and the
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glass itself of the ampoules are destroyed.
Several states require at least two breath tests be
conducted.

Utah gives only one (T.91).
Several courts have found this to be a violation of a

defendant's right to due process and equal protection of law.
As relevantly stated in People v. Riser, Cal., 305 P.2d
1, at 13:
... the state has no interest in
denying the accused access to all
evidence that can throw light on
issues in the case....
The unfettered discretion given peace officers as to which
chemical test is to be given one person and another chemical test
which is to be given other persons in the same classification is
not equal.
Therefore, Utahfs Implied Consent Law is unconstitutional
as a denial of due process and equal protection both on its face
and as it is applied.
Furthermore, the results of the breathalyzer test (an
affirmative act) should not have been admitted in evidence in this
criminal trial because such was a denial of appellant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, in violation of Utah Const.,
Art. I, §§12, as interpreted by Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315
(1980), the applicable law at the time of trial of this instant
case (1981) although since overruled by American Fork v. Cosgrove,
Utah, 701 P.2d 1069(1985).

See, also, State v. McCumber, Utah, 622
-20-

P.2d 353 (1980).
This principle of law will be more fully discussed in
Point III as it relates to field sobriety tests.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE FIELD
SOBRIETY TESTS.
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that a suspect
or an accused cannot be compelled to perform roadside or field
sobriety tests.

(Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168

(1983); Justice Durham, concurring in result, but not as to custody,
that field sobriety tests violate right against self-incrimination
under Utah Const., Art. I, §12, as interpreted by Hansen v. Owens,
Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980)).
It is true that Hansen, supra, was overruled by American
Fork v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P. 2d 1069 (1985).

Nevertheless, Hansen,

supra, was the applicable law at the time of the alleged offense
charged in this instant case.

And, Cosgrove, supra, cannot be

applied retroactively to deprive appellant of her then vested constitutional rights.

To attempt such would in effect amount to an

ex post facto law, which is prohibited.

(U.S. Const., Art. I, §10;

Utah Const., Art. I, §18.)
Consequently this point will be discussed by applying the
law as it existed at the pertinent time and not as it exists at the
present time because of Cosgrove, supra.
In this instant case, the appellant was compelled to
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perform field sobriety tests in that she had been taken into
custody, arrested (T.122, and T.123), and commanded (T.48) to
perform field sobriety tests.

She was refused her request for a

lawyer until she had performed a test (T.122).
Utah Const., Art. I, §12 provides:
... an accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself....
(Emphasis added.)
In Hansen, supra, this court held specifically that this
language was intended to have a broader meaning (all-inclusive,
i.e., all evidence: physical, documentary, testimonial) than the
phrase used in U.S. Const., Amend. V:
... to be a witness against himself...
In Hansen, supra, this court held that an accused could
not be compelled to furnish an example of his handwriting (an affirmative act, non-testimonial evidence).

Further, this court declined

to follow the principle adopted in Shmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 908 (1966).
In Shmerber, supra, the United States Supreme Court held
that the state provisions against self-incrimination meant the same
thing as the federal provision.

Thus, protection was limited to

testimonial evidence; not physical or documentary evidence.
This court in Hansen, supra, however, reasoned that every
word in the Constitution of Utah had been carefully chosen and must
be given its own separate and commonly understood meaning.
That interpretation of the Utah constitutional provision
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was further explained, later that same year, in McCumber, supra.
There this court explained that the prohibition against selfincrimination applies to affirmative acts that a defendant may be
compelled to do.
It may be noted that most states which have provisions
in their constitutions similar to Utah's have held that their provisions protecting against self-incrimination are identical to the
provision of the federal constitution.

The United States Supreme

Court, however, has recently upheld the prerogative of the different
states to interpret their constitutions as they deem proper.

South

Dakota v. Nevill, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
Utah was one of those states which had chosen to give a
different meaning to a constitutional provision than the federal
court's interpretation of a similar provision.

Thus, the courts of

Utah were bound to follow that interpretation until it was overruled
by Cosgrove, supra.
Thus, it appears that the results of field sobriety tests
were the type of evidence that fell within Utah's interpretation of
its own constitutional provision protecting an accused from selfincrimination.

Field tests are affirmative acts.

They are designed

to communicate information to police officers regarding the guilt
or innocence of one suspected of driving under the influence.

The

tests provide the officers with evidence that can be and is used
against an accused in a criminal action.
Appellant firmly contends that the results of field sobrie
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tests should have been suppressed as evidence because she did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive her right not to be compelled to
give evidence against herself.

Appellant further submits that she

did not knowingly or voluntarily waive that right because she was
not advised of her right.

She sought advice by requesting her

lawyer, but was refused a lawyer until she had performed a test
(T.122) and was commanded to take the field sobriety tests (T.48).
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the use
of involuntary or coerced testimonial evidence in a criminal trial
necessitates reversal, regardless of how much other evidence of
guilt remains.

(Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); and

Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 505 (1963)).
Applying Hansen, supra, all involuntary or coerced
evidence necessitates reversal.
Thus, the appellant requests that this court rule the
admission of the field sobriety test results constituted reversible
error.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY ADMITTING CUSTODIAL TESTIMONY WITHOUT
GIVING THE MIRANDA WARNING.
During trial, the arresting officer, James W. Pryor,
testified that the appellant stated she had been drinking (T.34).
Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the
appellant was being questioned while in custody, but the Miranda
warning had not been given by the officer (T.122 and T.123).
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Pursuant to the Miranda decision, an accused must be
advised of certain specific constitutional rights, including the
right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a suspect has been taken into
custody and otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Utah law has refined Miranda even further.

In Holman v.

Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that
a driver, suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, is
at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given
the Miranda warning.

The ruling in Holman was reaffirmed in Smith

v. Cox, Utah, 609 P.2d 1332 (1980).

There, the Utah Supreme Court

held that the defendant had the constitutional right not to give
evidence against himself and must be given Miranda warnings if his
statements are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding against him.
In this instant case, the prosecution contended that the
questioning was of the general inquiry type and appellant was not
in custody or under arrest.
necessary.

Therefore, Miranda warnings were not

This contention is contrary to the facts.

was in custody and under arrest (T.122 and T.123).

The appellant

(See, also,

Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 (1983), Justice
Durham concurring in result.)
Miranda, however, can be understood more dearly by inter-25-

preting an earlier United States Supreme Court decision.

In

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 845 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d
977 (1964), the court held that a defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel when the interrogation begins to focus on a
particular suspect and that no statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him in a criminal
trial.
From the very nature of the offense, a suspected drunk
driver comes within the protection of the principle developed in
the Escobedo case as soon as he is stopped by the police officer.
At the point of detention, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime, and has begun to focus on that
particular suspect.
Appellant strongly contends that she falls within the
protections afforded by the aforementioned Utah and United States
Supreme Court decisions.

First, under Escobedo, the officer's

detention and investigation was not for a general inquiry.

The

officer's interrogation was specifically focusing in on the appellant
as a suspected drunk driver.

Second, the officer did not give the

requisite Miranda warnings to the appellant.

Consequently, any

oral statements made by the appellant during that time should not
have been used against her at trial.
Further, the appellant specifically requested and was
refused permission to contact her attorney when the officer began
the interrogation at the scene of arrest (T.65).
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It should be noted

that when a suspect requests an attorney, an officer is generally
obliged to cease any interrogation immediately and within a reasonable time provide the accused with an opportunity to contact an
attorney.

People v. Traubert, Colo., 608 P.2d 342 (1980).
The prosecutor hinted that the appellant waiver her con-

stitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
however, is absurd.

Such reasoning,

First, the burden was upon the prosecution to

demonstrate that the appellant intentionally and voluntarily relinquished her constitutional right against self-incrimination.

It

was extremely difficult for the appellant to relinquish the rights
she was never even informed of.

Thus, it does not appear that the

prosecution met its burden in proving that the appellant effectively
waived her rights.
Based on the foregoing, the appellant submits that several
of her constitutional rights were violated.
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, appellant's
5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated.
Further, appellant was denied her 6th Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel.

Finally, appellant's right to due process

and equal protection was violated.
Therefore, appellant urges this court to rule the admission
at trial of her oral statements as reversible error and to thereby
reverse the conviction or grant a new trial.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
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BY ADMITTING RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST AT THE TIME OF THE TEST
AS EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL
IN THE BLOOD AT THE TIME OF DRIVING.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44(a) , provides that it is
unlawful to drive while under the influence of alcohol. Therefore,
for constitutional due process to be afforded the appellant, there
must be some evidence of the amount of alcohol at the time of
driving to determine if the appellant was under the influence of
alcohol at the time of driving.
There was no such evidence produced at trial (T.79, T.80,
T.81, T.87, and T.88).
The only evidence was the amount of alcohol at the time
of the breath test (T.79 and T.80).
Therefore, the appellantfs objection to the admission of
all exhibits, motions to suppress, dismiss, mistrial, etc., all of
which related to the amount of alcohol at the time of the breath
test rather than at the time of driving should not have been overruled or denied (T.9, T.135, T.136, T.137, and T.138).
The trial court's rulings denied the appellant due process
and equal protection of the law.

Judgment should be reversed.

POINT VI
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTIONS OF BEING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
The trial court instructed the jury:
... in prosecutions for the
offense of driving a motor vehicle
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while under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor, the amount of
alcohol in the defendant's blood,
as shown by chemical analysis of
the blood or breath, give rise to
the following presumptions:
... (c) If there was at
the time of driving 0.08
percent or more by weight
of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, it shall be presumed
that the defendant was under
the influence of an intoxicating liquor.
These presumptions may be rebutted.
By that I mean that these presumptions
may be overcome by other competent
evidence. In other words, it does
not limit the right of the prosecution
of (sic) the defense to introduce any
other competent evidence bearing on
the question as to whether or not the
defendant was under the influence of
an intoxicating liquor.
The jury shall weigh all available
evidence introduced to determine whether
or not such presumption has been overcome .
In admitting evidence of a chemical
analysis of blood or breath, the court
does not determine the accuracy of the
test. Such is a question of fact for
the jury alone to determine. The presumption referred to arises only if the
jury first determines that a reliable
test is present. (T. 146 and T.147).
The appellant excepted to this instruction for many
reasons:
1.

No reliable test was given.

2.

The words "intoxicating liquor" were used rather
than the word "alcohol," as prescribed in the
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statute, and neither of which was defined.
3.

The words f,shall be presumed" made the
presumption mandatory or conclusive, even
though the court stated the presumption
was rebuttable or permissive.

We shall later in this brief discuss the distinction and
more precise definitions of the various types of presumptions, e.g.,
If

premissive ,M "mandatory," or "conclusive."

(Jeffries and Stephans,

Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
Yale L.J. 1325 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 422 U.S. 510 (1979);
State v. Robichaux, Utah, 639 P.2d 207 (1981); State v. Walton,
Utah, 646 P.2d 689 (1982); and State v. Atkinson, Utah Third Judicial
District Court, Summit County, No. 975, filed August 16, 1983).
The common definition of the word "presumed" is to suppose
that which is presumed is to be taken as being true without the
necessity of proof.

And the common definition of the word "shall"

is that it is mandatory.

(Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 911

(1974)).
It is elementary law, without the need of supporting authorities, that every accused person is clothed with the presumption of
innocence and cannot be found guilty without the state proving every
single element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The burden of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt remains with the state throughout the entire trial.
It never, never, never shifts to the accused.

(Utah Code Ann. 1953,

§76-1-501; State v. Walton, supra; State v. Robichaux, supra).
this provision of the law has reached constitutional dimensions
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And

through decisional law.

(In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1969)).

In Winship, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about
the constitutionality stature of the
reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly
hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
(Id., at 364.)
The Utah Supreme Court in Robichaux stated:
... It is ... to be kept in mind
that the burden of proving defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
always upon the state, both initially
and ultimately. (State v. Curtis,
Utah, 542 P. 2d 744 (1975) . See~7 also,
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct.
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)).
It is true that our courts have long recognized the propriety of drawing reasonable inferences from proved facts and that
there may be evidentiary presumptions applied.

Nevertheless, evi-

dentiary presumptions do not relieve the state from its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

is for the trier of facts to determine.

It is not for the court

in its instruction to command as being proved because conclusively
presumed.

(Sandstrom v. Montana, supra).
That is precisely what the instant instruction accomplished.

The trial court commanded as being proved when it stated that it
shall be presumed.

The instruction did not become permissive by

stating possible rebuttal.

If standing alone without rebuttal, the
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instruction was a conclusive presumption in violation of U.S. Const.,
Amend. XIV.

And requirement for rebuttal would have had to come

from the appellant, which would have been in violation of U.S. Const.,
Amend V, by shifting the burden of proof to her by compelling her
to prove her innocence.
Besides these federal constitutional requirements, Utah
Const., Art. I, §12, provides that an accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence in his defense.

To compel rebuttal to the pre-

sumption would be to compel the appellant to give evidence in her
defense.
Had the instant instruction stated that the jury may
presume, the presumption would have been permissive and proper.
However, when it stated the jury shall presume, it became conclusive
and unconstitutional.
Simply stated, permissive presumptions are proper.
mandatory or conclusive presumptions are not proper.

However,

Permissive

presumptions give the jurors the choice to determine the burden of
proof.

Whereas, mandatory or conclusive presumptions give the juror

no choice to determine the burden of proof.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, where the jurors were
only told the law presumed a fact that the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, and
were not told they had a choice or that they might not shall infer
that conclusion, but, in effect, make their finding mandatory, the
United States Supreme Court held:
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Because the jury may have interpreted
the challenged presumption as
conclusive, like the presumptions in
Morissette y. United States, 342 U.S.
246, and United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 431 U.S. 422, or as shifting
the burden of persuasion, like that in
Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, and
because either interpretation would have
violated the Fourteenth Amendment
requirement that the state prove every
element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, the instruction is
unconstitutional. Pp. 514-527.
(a) The effect of a presumption
in a jury instruction is determined by the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted it, not by a state court's
interpretation of its legal
import. Pp. 514, 517.
(b) Conclusive presumptions
"conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with
which the law endows the accused
and which extends to every element
of the crime,M Morissette, supra
at 275 and they "invadle the] fact
finding function," United States
Gypsum Co., supra at 446, which in
a criminal case the law assigns
to the jury.
This court has very recently held that the use of a mandatory rebuttable presumption in a jury instruction is unconstitutional.

(State v. Pacheco, Utah,

citing State v. Chambers, Utah,

P.2d

P.2d

(1985),

(1985), Francis v.

Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), State v. Walton, supra, and
Sandstrom v. Montana, supra).
Conclusive presumptions are just plain unconstitutional and
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may not be given in instructions to jurors.
This was boldly and properly held by the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick while sitting in the Appellate Division of the
Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, in
State v. Atkinson, supra.
From every approach, the instant presumption is conclusive
and unconstitutional.

The trial court erred by giving it. And

the judgment of the lower courts must be reversed or the matter
remanded for a new trial without it again being given to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The trial of this matter was fatally flawed by many fundamental errors, only a few of which are contained in this brief.
Actually, the very first point is more than enough for reversal or
remand.

The other points also justify the same result. Still,

other points were not included because of sheer time and space.
Oral argument is hereby requested if the respondent does
not confess error or if this court does not summarily rule as
requested by the appellant.
Respectfully submitted this

(^_\^- day of January,

1986.

PHIL L. HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

yfif~£r- day of January,

1986, four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the
Office of the Salt Lake City Attorney, 100 City & County Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, addressed to the attention of Roger
F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Attorney, and Walter R. Miller.

CC^J^r-V^c^i••
PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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FEB U f l i
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. CRA-83-1

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
SUSAN WOMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

PERTINENT FACTS
On the 3th day of January, 1982 at approximately

10:00

p.m., the appellant was observed by Officer James Pryor, Salt
Lake City Police Dept., driving her car in a westerly direction
on 900 South between State and Main Streets in Salt Lake City.
The officer was one-fourth block behind
ooserved

the appellant when he

the appellant going west on 900 South and into the

storage lane to make a left-hand turn onto Main Street.
After the appellant had entered the storage lane, she turned
abruptly into the right-hand lane on 900 South and then turned
right onto Main Street and proceeded in a northerly direction.
The appellant was initially stopped and charged with the
offense of making an improper right-hand turn from the storage
lane.

When the arresting

officer approached

the appellant's
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POINT I
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED
BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
OF THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST .FOR LACK OF FOUNDATION
FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY.
The appellant cites Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d
(Utah 1983) for this contention.

1314

However, Murray City (decided

after appellant's arrest and conviction) acknowledges that Section
41-6-44.3 is a codification of the findings necessary to establish
a proper foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence.
The Supreme Court stated at 1320, that- Section 41-6-44.3:
" [R]equires an affirmative finding by the
trial court that 1) the calibration and
testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer
and the ampoules were performed in accord^aee
with the standard^ established by tha* Commissioner of P U D I I C Safety, 2) the affidavits
were prepared in the regular course erf~ tue
public officer's duties,, 3) 'that they were
prepared contemporaneously with the act,
condition or event, and 4) the x source of
information from which made and the method
and circumstances of ttxoir preparation were
such as to—irftdTCate their 'trustworthi ness . f "
The court in Murray City concludes by stating at 1321:
"We hold that so long as there is compliance
with mandates of the statute, namely, contemporaneous stanoards in the regular course
of the officer's duties, and indications
of trustworthiness, the affidavits regarding
-flie maintenance of a breathalyzer machine
are admissible under 41-6-44.3 as a valid
statutory exception to the hearsay rule.
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As su-:::. '.:ose a f f i d a v i t s establish a rebuttable
.presumption that the breathalyzer rar^rre
w* -; f :r,-'»- : .-;n i rv:: correctly. ,f

There i s i i o reqi 11rement in this statute that expert testimony
be

a f f orded

r e g a r d i r ig

t: 1: 1 e a c c u r a c y

• : • f t i:ea 11: 1 a ] } z e r

r • = • '"11I ts

t:

C o n c e r n i ng

t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a 1 i t y of such

statutes , the Murray

C i_ ty c c: • i 13 : t s a i • 3 a t j 3 1 7, 1: i: :i a t s 1: a t u t e s a n d o r d i n a n c e s i
11

[A] re e n d o w e d w i t h a s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n
of v a l i d i t y ; a n d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t b e
d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l if t h e r e is any
reasonable basis upon which they c a n be
f o u n d to c o m e w i t h i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
frame work [ s i c ] , , , '"
From

the t r a n s c r i p t , the requirements

of statute

.14-6-44 „ 1

appear: tc !: la • e 1: eei i m e t
POINT II
13 THAT THE TRIAL COURT

A P P E L L A N T ' S SECOND POINT OF CONTENTION
1

N^Tir".'! \i" ">

' I H

MnFIi^J TO P U P P R E S S

I 'i

EVIDENCE OF IriE BREATHALYZER TEST BASED ON A DENIAL ub I U K
PROCESS AND EQUAL
Iii'

yet

i -l - i .i

111

to b e d e c i d e d

state,

however,

| i

"JI

i • ;

b y the Utah

that

Utah

i

PROTECTION.
I I

i

Supreme

DU1 statutes

i 1 T M =»

II

Dour' »

Supreme C u u L 1 in b l l i u t t

Murray

1

11 i ^

C ity iii

4 1 - 6 - 4 4 a n d 41-*- - 4 4 . 2

• :i 11 ' i i f 111 II , I MM i; [nil ] I 111 i iu.i I | i I »'1 i 111
Toe Utah

i i n

i M I

f I I inj I J w

v . D o n as ,

b b , 1- , *. -I 15 9

(Utah 1976} , where t h e i m p l i e d c o n s e n t law was read contemporaneously
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with the field tests, instead of before, stated that deliberating
such a distinction clearly "elevated form over substance."
In the present case, appellant's concern over the arresting
officer's method of explaining

the implied consent law fits

in the category of elevating form over substance and is without
merit.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S THIRD POINT OF CONTENTION IS THAT THE TRIAL COURT
CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY COMMANDING THE APPELLANT TO
SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS.
The appellant
1168

cites Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664

(Utah 1983) in support of this contention.

P.2d

However, a

careful reading of that case indicates that the court in earner
found that the requests by the police officer for a field sobriety
test did not amount to compelling the defendant to give evidence
against himself.
Furthermore, 41-6-44.10(a) states:
" [A]ny person operating a motor vehicle
in this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests
of his breath, blood, or urine...."
From the available facts as set forth in the transcript,
appellant was not compelled by the officer to perform a field
test; the officer used interchangeably
quested," and

"commanded," but stated

the terms "asked," "rethe appellant "agreed"

CITY " r

WOMACK

. A-J^.

i

i

i

-

Mh'M'JHAND'JM UECXSION

i

i

^ p e r -j J

,i

i |

a motor vehicle, the appellant impliedly consented tt; TfJ:h tests.
Appellant
* - .1

11 I

I N

* 1 >^ c i t e s
i

Hansen

v. Owens, 6 1 -» P , 2d

i n i ill i

with handwriting

i

ii

c» i

samples ana was discussed

662 P.2d 353 (Utah

ly80j

as being

115 i L tah

in State v. McCumber f

carefully

::nfmej

t- i t s

t:act,s.
POINT IV
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERPEL BY
\.

fcl

f i
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III I
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he
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i iSpet
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1331

t h-r|

11..1I
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. 11 a ML

,.

f
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i ne
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i -A ,

111 I

i

i

when a s u s p e c t

i

i M ;i h
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attested

given.

^ ^ -' 1 I a. ,i'i i " i i t a t. euu »!ii
"vies,

Cox,

be

ent i t leu
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oe
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a-

not

i *.* i i « j s

War^" * mist

it

is

H limn

ai r e s ted ,

proceed in-

tests

reaffirmed

on
i 11 i i

i,-» i i . i c M ' 11 i

field
ri

i

influence

41-^-44.10,

A p p e ,. l a i i i .

1979)

»III

criminal

Section

attorney

heavily

rl ) L i U d i i

: r ivinn

* i i" n J 11 |

relies

that
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stands

driving

11 i
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£UL t h e
under
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proposition
influence,
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However, the court in both

Holman and Smith specifically mentioned

that a suspect must

be arrested before the Miranda Warning needs be given.
There is little doubt that at one point during the officer's
investigation an arrest was made and that the arresting officer
failed to give the Miranda Warning.
supra, defined

an arrest as including

(1) Site of interrogation;
accused;

Justice Howe in earner,
the following factors:

(2) Investigation

focused on the

(3) Objective indicia of arrest; (4) Length and form

of interrogation.

Justice Howe went on to say that in applying

these factors to a field sobriety test, that a field
test did not constitute an arrest.

sobriety

Justice Howe noted that

although the environment of a field sobriety test may be authoritative, it is by no means coercive.
Assuming, arguendo, however, that because no Miranda Warning
was given, and the results of the breathalyzer test were therefore
inadmissable, there was still sufficient evidence to support
the jury verdict.

Appellant admitted to the officer that she

had been drinking before an arrest was made; the officer smelled
the odor of alcohol; he was of the opinion appellant was under
the influence of alcohol; furthermore, before an arrest was
made, appellant

failed

to follow instructions and failed to

perform the four field sobriety tests satisfactorily.
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Therefore, although the trial court may have eueiil by a I i: .itting
the results o f the breathalyzer test, it d i d n o t, e r r b y a 11 o w i n g
In

Li ii I !

"

i

<;\-l field

tests or the appellant 1 s

iubiw-1

admission of her jonsumption of alcohol.
POINT V
AHJLLL

'hi

iNJPI
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11 ni I d [ [ I I J I ' i
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t- h ^

C o d e i i i i r :i

!|

does
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c L a i TI . T h e

between

Officer

Pryor,

the arresting

'

11

I M in r

i i 'l

i''

i

i

wao a d m i n i s t e r e d
t wo

this

hour

at

prDvisions

i > i 11 nouns
of

S w o t i-oTi

1 9 5 3 a s a: ae i id e 3 , s a i :i e i i • 3 e i i • :: e

officer,

11 in i , a n d t b i
i > , , Ji

[ i j j ,

4 1 - t - 4 4 . 5 ( 2 •' ,

w>. J .
U t an

• , a s j: r : p e r 1 } r e c e i ed .

POINT VI
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY
A D MIrT ' I11N G P. E S [ 11 , T S ?) I: TI IE B R EI ! TI I T E S T WI T H C • I IT F 0I IN D ?, TI • II t I 0 F
ACCURACY BECAUSE OF RADIO INTERFERENCE.
Appellant did not preserve this point for appeal.
tl ve

i: 1 ii i iii

i )

*'i' '

*d .

Accordingly,
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POINT VII
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTION OF
BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL
Appellant is correct that under Section 76-1-501, a defendant
is presumed

to be innocent until each element of a crime is

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, this was clearly

articulated in the jury instructions (T142).

Appellant overlooks

the fact that with regard to a crime charged

there can exist

a presumption of fajs-t (Section 76-1-503). ,The statute states:
"An evidentiary presumption established
by this code or anv other penal statute
ti.e., witness 41-6-44(3) and its .08% presumption] has the following consequences:
1) wnen evidence of facts which support
the presumption exist, the issue of the
existence of the presumed fact must be submitted
to the jury unless the court is satisfied
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates
the presumed fact;
2) In submitting the issue of the existence
of a presumed fact to the jury, the court
shall charge that while the presumed fact
must on all evidence be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts
giving rise to the presumption as evidence
of the presumed fact."
In connection with the notion of presumptions, Utah Rules
of Evidence 14(a) (in effect prior to September 1, 1983) states
that if the facts from which the presumption is derived have
any probative value as evidence of the existence of a presumed
fact, the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establish-
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ing the non-existence of the presumed

fact

is upon

DECISION
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CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to demonstrate
court's rulings were in error.

Therefore, the Judgment and

Verdict are affirmed, and the case is remanded
Court for imposition of sentence.
Dated this

that the lower

February, 1985.
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